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Abstract—Timing side-channel attacks pose a major threat
to embedded systems due to their ease of accessibility. We
propose CIDPro, a framework that relies on dynamic program
diversification to mitigate timing side-channel leakage. The pro-
posed framework integrates the widely used LLVM compiler
infrastructure and the increasingly popular RISC-V FPGA soft-
processor. The compiler automatically generates custom instruc-
tions in the security critical segments of the program, and the
instructions execute on the RISC-V custom co-processor to pro-
duce diversified timing characteristics on each execution instance.
CIDPro has been implemented on the Zynq7000 XC7Z020 FPGA
device to study the performance overhead and security trade-
offs. Experimental results show that our solution can achieve
80% and 86% timing side-channel capacity reduction for two
benchmarks with an acceptable performance overhead compared
to existing solutions. In addition, the proposed method incurs only
a negligible hardware area overhead of 1% slices of the entire
RISC-V system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems have become an integral part of our
lives, and hence it is essential they are secure. Unfortunately,
the cryptographic schemes in embedded systems are deployed
in unforeseen adversarial settings where keys can be compro-
mised through side-channel attacks. Such attacks have been
reported on embedded devices [1] where the attacker extracts
secret information from a victim program by observing a
physical phenomenon, e.g. execution time and power con-
sumption, during its execution [2]. In this paper, we consider
the information leakage wherein the secret information of a
victim program is unintentionally leaked to the attacker via
the timing channel. For example, a modular exponentiation
function (modExp) used in RSA decryption (as shown in
Algorithm 1), induces information leakage in execution time
due to the absence of an else-branch, while the condition
of the if-branch depends on the secret key k. The attacker
can observe the execution time of the victim program and
establish a correlation between the observation and hypothesis
of the secret information such as a cryptographic key. In this
paper, we show that existing software countermeasures for
mitigating timing leakage are ineffective especially when the
cryptographic algorithms execute in bare metal mode or with
an embedded OS (Operating System), which is common in
embedded systems.
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Fig. 1: Timing histogram of (a) a baseline program, (b)
after transformation using cross-copying, (c) using conditional
assignment and (d) using left-to-right sliding window. In each
plot, the X-axis and Y-axis show the execution time in clock
cycles and number of instances with that execution time,
respectively.
To overcome the limitations of the existing software coun-
termeasures, we propose a framework called CIDPro that
relies on dynamic hardware diversification to vary the timing
characteristics of the program during execution. CIDPro is
built upon the widely used LLVM compiler infrastructure
[3] and targets the Rocket core [4] which is based on the
RISC-V ISA. The framework is able to reduce timing side-
channel leakage significantly by utilizing hardware diversifica-
tion modules invoked by custom instructions that are inserted
in the original source code.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses
existing countermeasures for timing leakage reduction, while
CIDPro is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we provide
a detailed discussion of the experimental results and Section V
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II. RELATED WORK
A typical countermeasure against timing side-channel at-
tacks is to apply program transformations such that the crit-
ical functions (e.g. modExp) complete in constant time. Two
representative program transformation techniques are cross-
copying [5] and conditional assignment [6]. In cross-copying,
an else-branch is added with a dummy task that mimics the
execution pattern in the if-branch to equalize the execution
time of both branches. In conditional assignment, the condition
is directly encoded into the branches using bit masks and bit-
wise logical operators.
The countermeasures, mentioned above, suffer from several
limitations: First, the program transformations are typically
performed on high-level programs. As such, compiler opti-
mizations may inadvertently reduce the effectiveness of the
countermeasures, causing timing side-channel vulnerabilities
at the micro-architecture level. In addition, even though the
conditional assignment removes critical conditions by flatten-
ing and converting them into primitive arithmetic and bitwise
instructions, certain instructions (especially multiplications,
divisions, etc.) may cause timing side-channel leakage due
to variable clock cycle requirements based on the operand
values. Second, both the existing techniques cannot minimize
the hamming weight of different keys. Third, both the existing
techniques result in performance degradation as additional
instructions are introduced to equalize the execution times.
Algorithm 1 Modular Exponentiation
Input: data y, private key k of length d, integer N
Output: yk mod N
1: procedure MODEXP(y, k, N )
2: r ← 1
3: for i← 1 to d do
4: if (k mod 2 == 1) then . Critical Condition
5: r ← (r × y) mod N
6: y ← (y × y) mod N
7: k ← k  1
8: return r mod N
The sliding window technique [7] has been previously pre-
sented to reduce the effect of the hamming weight difference
of keys on the execution time of the modExp function. This
technique not only improves the performance but also reduces
the timing-channel leakage. However, the sliding window
technique is not able to eliminate the information leakage. In
particular, the residual timing leakage is notable on embedded
systems with a low noise runtime environment.
These limitations of the existing approaches are highlighted
in Figures 1(b)-(d), which show the timing histograms of the
RSA algorithm (that includes the modExp function) when it
is executed with two different keys in the absence of an OS,
i.e. in a bare metal environment that is common in embedded
systems [8]. The timing characteristics corresponding to the
two different keys are clearly distinguishable with the ex-
isting approaches and hence, they do not provide effective
countermeasures against timing side-channel attacks. As such,
executing functions in constant time cannot be easily achieved
in software, particularly for embedded systems.
Timing side-channel attacks to extract not only the Ham-
ming weight but also the value of fixed Diffie-Hellman expo-
nents and RSA keys, have been reported in [9]. To mitigate
the attacks, the authors presented blinding techniques to ran-
domize the execution time. However, the blinding technique
requires a significant amount of computations, which poses a
heavy burden for lightweight processors in embedded systems.
Hardware solutions usually require substantial changes to
the processor architecture that impacts all programs running
on the processor and also incur performance overhead on
non-security critical programs. A secure processor that can
protect against side-channel attacks using masking and hiding
techniques, is proposed in [10]. Besides an independent data
path to implement the masking scheme, a pipeline randomizer
adds non-deterministic dummy control and data signals to the
processor data path. Another secure processor called Ascend,
is presented in [11] that relies on an ORAM controller to ob-
fuscate the address bus. However, information leakage cannot
be prevented due to on-chip resource sharing. An instruction
shuffler is proposed in [12] to shuffle independent instructions
randomly for protection against side-channel attacks.
In this paper, we propose the CIDPro framework as a
countermeasure against timing side-channel attacks especially
in low noise embedded systems by utilizing both software and
hardware methods with minimal resource overhead.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we describe the proposed CIDPro framework
and its hardware implementation that utilizes custom instruc-
tions to effectively reduce timing side-channel leakage with
low hardware cost and acceptable performance overhead.
A. CIDPro Framework
The premise of our framework is hardware diversification
using custom instructions to execute diversified (time-varying)
instructions (DIs) as shown in Figure 2.
The original source code of the program is given to the
framework, which consists of two parts: 1) An LLVM pass
transforming the source code into an assembly file, and
2) custom instruction generation of a set of m diversified
instructions DI = {DI1, DI2, . . . , DIm}. Each DIi ∈ DI
with 1 ≤ i ≤ m performs an arithmetic operation such as an
ADD, MUL, etc, which is usually found in the source code of
cryptographic primitives. Further, each IIji ∈ DIi represents
a diversified version of the same operation with 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Therefore every instance IIji provides the same functionality
(i.e. f(II1i ) = f(II
2
i ) = · · · = f(IIni )), but exhibits different
execution time characteristics.
For each DIi, a corresponding hardware module
CoPr(DIi) is implemented in a hardware description lan-
guage (HDL). These modules are integrated as custom in-
structions (CI) in the Secured Processor together with a
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Fig. 2: Proposed CIDPro Framework
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Diversity Control Unit and a Pseudo Random Number Gen-
erator (PRNG). At runtime, the Diversity Control Unit selects
the corresponding DIi based on the CI, while the random
number determines the IIji to be executed. Hence with every
invocation of a CI, a different IIji is selected, resulting in
non-deterministic execution times of the program that reduces
timing side-channel leakage.
The Custom Instruction Integration Unit facilitates the
interfacing of LLVM and the set of DIs. An LLVM pass
automatically identifies the arithmetic operations in the LLVM
IR (Intermediate Representation) that exist in DI and that are
supported by the Co-Processor. The corresponding CIs are then
integrated into the original source code.
Unlike existing hardware countermeasures, the proposed
CIDPro framework requires minimal changes to the processor
architecture by utilizing a dedicated co-processor to execute
CIs. This leads to low resource overhead and design efforts. In
addition, the framework avoids negative side effects on non-
security critical programs that run in the same environment
as the security critical programs, since the former will be
executed on the base processor unaffected. Furthermore, a
developer does not need to write programs in a new language
or with security in mind.
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Fig. 4: Hardware Diversification on Co-processor
The CIs are kept as private information and are automat-
ically inserted into the security critical programs to mitigate
the information leakage via timing side-channels. We assume
that our proposed framework is not available to the attacker
and we also do not consider hardware probing or reverse
engineering attacks through which the attacker can obtain
details of the diversified hardware implementation. Finally,
it is worth mentioning that while we have only considered
single operations as custom instructions in this paper, the
framework can be easily extended to generate time-varying
custom instructions that consist of multiple operations.
B. Hardware Implementation
The Secured Processor shown in Figure 2 is a RISC-V
architecture that includes a Rocket core, a custom defined
Rocket Chip Co-Processor (RoCC), L1 caches and a Floating
Point Unit (FPU) [4]. The RoCC, which executes the CIs, is a
tightly integrated extension to the processor pipeline as shown
in Figure 3. This enables the RoCC to stall the entire pipeline
until the CI has completed its execution. In our work, the
Secured Processor is implemented on the Zynq7000 XC7Z020
FPGA device.
The Co-Processor utilizes the integrated DSPs on the FPGA
fabric to support the operations required by the CIs. Instead
of implementing multiple versions of the same instruction
for each IIji ∈ DIi with varying execution times, only one
hardware module is implemented for f(IIji ) for all elements
in DIi. To emulate the different execution times of II
j
i , the
PRNG is connected to a comparator that triggers a valid signal
when the random value matches the output of the timer. This
indicates the completion of the operation on the Co-Processor
and the valid result is passed to the Rocket core (refer to
Figure 4).
The funct signal determines the operation to be executed on
the Diversifying ALU (Di-ALU) and also allows the developer
to limit the range of numbers generated by the PRNG. A
higher range for the random value results in a larger reduc-
tion in the timing side-channel leakage. However, this also
culminates in a longer overall execution time for the program,
since the pipeline of the Rocket Chip stalls for long periods.
Hence a trade-off between channel leakage and execution time
should be considered by setting an appropriate diversification
level dl. The level specifies the number n = 2dl of diversified
instructions of which the execution times are varied from 1 to
n clock cycles. dl = 0 means no diversification. This trade-off
is discussed in Section IV-C.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section first describes the benchmark programs and
the metrics used in our evaluations. This is followed by the
investigation of the trade-off between performance overhead
and information leakage reduction of the CIDPro framework
in a low-noise runtime environment (i.e. bare-metal mode)
with respect to varying diversification levels. Finally, the
results of channel capacity reduction are presented to show
the effectiveness of CIDPro compared to existing solutions in
both low-noise and OS environments (i.e. Linux mode).
A. Benchmark Programs
To compare the effectiveness of the proposed solution with
existing methods, benchmark programs that can be imple-
mented on embedded systems (like RISC-V based systems)
that contain timing side-channel vulnerabilities are required.
In our experiments, we use the RSA modular exponentiation
(modExp) to encrypt or decrypt a message [13] from the
benchmark suite introduced in [14] and modular multiplication
(mulMod16) from the IDEA cipher [15]. Since these programs
originate from practical cryptographic algorithms with differ-
ent degrees of sophistication, they are meaningful candidates
for the evaluations.
B. Experimental Setup
A timing side-channel is a communication channel created
by unintentional information leakage by a victim program.
Here the input is the set of values given to a victim program
and the output is the timing observations of the program by
an attacker. Like any other communication channel, timing
side-channel can be measured by Shannon’s channel capacity
[16] which represents the tight upper bound on the information
transmission rate using that channel. We use a command-line
tool called LeakiEst [17] to estimate the side-channel capacity
from observations of program execution times. Benchmark
programs are executed on the Rocket chip system, and the
execution time is extracted through the performance counters
integrated in the Rocket chip. We collect 1000 samples for
each of the two secret inputs for each benchmark program to
obtain the leakage channel capacity using LeakiEst, which uses
the iterative Blahut-Arimoto algorithm [18], [19] to estimate
the channel capacity.
We perform a distinguishing experiment by running each
program with two distinct secret input values. Here the security
concern is that the secret keys can be inferred from the exe-
cution time based on the bit patterns of the keys. We compare
our proposed solution with two existing and widely used
solutions, i.e. cross-copying [6] and conditional assignment
[5]. In addition, we evaluated the sliding window technique
for the modular exponentiation benchmark [7], which is widely
used in cryptographic libraries [20] such as Libgcrypt. Left-
to-right (LR) windowed form with a window size of 3 is
considered in our experiments.
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Fig. 5: Timing histogram of CIDPro for the modExp bench-
mark with different diversification levels. In each plot, the X-
axis and Y-axis show the execution time in clock cycles and
number of instances with that execution time, respectively.
C. Performance overhead and security trade-offs
As mentioned in Section III-B, increasing the diversification
level in CIDPro increases randomness in the execution times
of programs leading to a reduction in information leakage via
timing side-channels. Figure 5 shows the timing histogram of
the LR version of modExp that utilizes the CIDPro framework
with different diversification levels. As can be observed, if
dl increases, the distributions for two different keys (i.e.
key0, key1) become indistinguishable which implies effective
mitigation of information leakage via timing side-channels.
Figure 6 shows the channel capacities and the average
execution times of the modExp benchmark using the CIDPro
framework with varying diversification levels compared to
existing solutions. BL, Ca, Cc and LR denote the baseline
program without countermeasures, and the program with the
existing countermeasures i.e. conditional assignment, cross-
copying, and left-to-right sliding window, respectively. PrBL
and PrLR represent the BL and LR programs that are modified
by CIDPro. As can be observed in Figure 6(a), the channel
capacities of BL, Ca, Cc and LR are almost equal to one,
which indicates a high timing information leakage. It is evident
that the timing leakage reduces significantly for PrBL and
PrLR with increasing diversification levels. In particular, PrLR
exhibits a higher reduction in channel capacity compared to
PrBL similar to the capacity comparison between LR and BL
(refer to Figure 1). Figure 6(b) shows that the execution times
of Ca and Cc are notably higher compared to the baseline
program, while LR has the lowest execution time among
all the techniques. Although PrBL and PrLR result in an
increased execution time compared to BL and LR, they are
still faster than Ca and Cc for almost all the diversification
levels considered. The increment in execution times of PrBL
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Fig. 6: Impact of various diversification levels on the modExp
benchmark in comparison to existing solutions
and PrLR in the range 2 ≤ dl ≤ 5 is relatively small compared
to those for dl > 5.
Figure 7 displays the result of the same experiment with
the mulMod16 benchmark. While Ca results in a reduction
in channel capacity, it has a significant increase in execution
time compared to the baseline program. Cc exhibits a better
performance than Ca, but it is not able to reduce channel
capacity in low-noise environments. PrBL has a significant
reduction in channel capacity. While the channel capacity
reduces considerably with an increase in the diversification
level, this adversely influences the execution time as expected.
For dl ≤ 5, the overall execution time for PrBL remains lower
than Cc and Ca.
D. Evaluation Results
Figure 8 compares the increased performance cost and the
leakage reduction of the various countermeasures with respect
to the baseline for the modExp and mulMod16 benchmarks
in bare-metal mode. The performance cost and the leakage
reduction are evaluated in terms of the average execution time
and the channel capacity, respectively. Pr denotes the programs
that utilize the proposed CIDPro with dl = 5 on LR for the
modExp and on BL for the mulMod16 benchmark.
As can be observed in the figure, the existing solutions
have a negligible reduction in channel capacity, while Pr
achieves a significant reduction. The channel capacity of Pr
is reduced to 20% and 14% for the modExp and mulMod16
benchmarks, respectively. Existing solutions and Pr result in
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Fig. 7: Impact of various diversification levels on the
mulMod16 benchmark in comparison to existing solutions
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Fig. 8: Impact on the average execution time and channel
capacity of CIDPro in comparison to existing solutions and
the baseline.
additional average execution time with the exception of LR
in the modExp benchmark. The execution time increases due
to the insertion of dummy instructions to balance branches in
security critical conditions for existing methods and the long
variable execution times of CIs. For the modExp benchmark,
Ca and Cc increase the execution time by over 50% com-
pared to BL, while the proposed solution requires only 13%
additional execution time.
Ca and Cc in the mulMod16 benchmark result in a signifi-
cant increase in execution time of 120% and 75% respectively
compared to BL. Even though the proposed CIDPro results in
a similar execution time for mulMod16 as Cc, it achieves a
significant reduction in channel capacity. It is worth mention-
TABLE I: Hardware Resource Utilization
RocketTile CPU FPU RoCC
Slices 6612 1331 3458 84
DSPs 34 4 20 10
ing that the timing cost in our proposed solution just applies to
the critical functions that use the CIs to mitigate timing side-
channel leakage. The execution time of the normal functions
remains unaffected.
Figure 9 reports the results of the binaries executed in a
Linux OS environment on the Rocket chip. The Linux OS is
very constrained with minimum effects on the programs and all
executable files are compiled and linked statically. Therefore
the timing noise level due to different auxiliary processes is
expected to be lower in contrast to a fully functional OS. This
means that the noise incurred by the Linux OS affects the
information leakage only marginally. As it can be observed
in Figure 9, the existing solutions (Ca and Cc) are not able
to achieve notable reductions in channel capacity. The results
show that Pr effectively mitigates the timing side-channel with
channel capacity below 0.2 and 0.12 for the modExp and
mulMod16 benchmarks, respectively.
E. Hardware Resource Utilization
Table I reports the hardware resource utilization of RoCC
that implements the hardware diversification as part of CIDPro
compared to the typical Rocket chip system (RocketTile)
that includes a processor core (CPU) and a floating point
unit (FPU). The hardware resource utilization is reported in
terms of the number of slices and DSP blocks for FPGA
implementation on the Zynq7000 FPGA device. The area
overhead of RoCC is negligible (i.e. 1% of slices) compared
to the entire Rocket chip system.
V. CONCLUSION
We have proposed CIDPro, a framework consisting of an
LLVM compiler pass and hardware diversification to minimize
timing side-channel leakage of cryptographic programs that
run on soft-processors in embedded systems. The proposed
framework utilizes custom instructions to realize the hardware
diversification without changing the base processor architec-
ture and incurring only 1% area overhead for the co-processor.
Experimental results targeting low noise runtime environments
on RISC-V based system demonstrated that our framework
achieves 80% and 86% timing side-channel capacity reduction
compared to existing solutions. In addition, we show that the
proposed solution leads to the best trade-off in timing leakage
reduction and performance overhead compared to the existing
countermeasures.
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